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Abstract Companies regularly have to address opposing interests from their
shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholder groups. Consequently, a wealth of
previous research has focused on how CEOs decide which stakeholder management
activities to pursue and prioritize. In contrast, however, surprisingly little research
has considered how (potential) investors react to a company’s management of
shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholders and what factors drive their reac-
tions in such contexts. We seek to fill this gap in the literature by conducting an
experimental scenario study (N = 997) in which investment behavior is analyzed
in situations in which management has to make a trade-off between shareholders’
and non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests. Our results show that (potential)
investors consider the assumed costs of fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’
interests and the perceived sustainability of doing so for corporate success when
making investment decisions in such contexts. In cases of low costs or high sus-
tainability, participants were more willing to invest in a company that favored non-
shareholding over shareholding stakeholders (thereby deciding against their
immediate financial interests), while the opposite was true in cases of high costs or
low sustainability. With these results, our paper broadens stakeholder theory’s focus
by taking individual investors’ reactions to corporate stakeholder management into
account. Moreover, it both provides evidence for and extends the ‘‘Enlightened
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Stakeholder Theory’’, which proposes that organizations should fulfill stakeholders’
interests if doing so contributes to long-term firm value enhancement, but has so far
not considered the role of the costs necessary for fulfilling stakeholders’ claims in
such decisions.
Keywords Stakeholder management  (Potential) investors  Investment
decisions  Financial sustainability  Costs  Enlightened stakeholder
theory
1 Introduction
It has frequently been acknowledged that organizations need to constantly weigh the
needs of different stakeholders (i.e., those groups that are affected by or that can
affect their objectives and actions; Freeman 1984; Laplume et al. 2008). In
particular, conflicts can arise between shareholding stakeholders and non-share-
holding ones, such as customers, suppliers, employees, and the communities in
which organizations operate (Donaldson and Preston 1995). Trying to solve these
conflicts, competing theoretical perspectives have emerged. On the one hand, neo-
classicists have claimed that companies should focus on enhancing returns for their
shareholding stakeholders without giving too much consideration to the concerns of
non-shareholding stakeholders (Friedman 1970). On the other hand, stakeholder
theorists (Freeman 1984; Jones and Felps 2013) have argued that organizations
should take into account the interests of all their stakeholders, including both
shareholding and non-shareholding ones.
Against this background, a wealth of research has dealt with the question of how
CEOs handle stakeholder dilemmas and according to which factors they decide
which stakeholders’ claims to fulfill (e.g., Adams et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 1997).
However, there is a decisive research gap regarding the question of how (potential)
investors react to corporate stakeholder management activities (Hillenbrand et al.
2013). Although companies regularly need to make trade-offs between the interests
of shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholders (Clarkson 1995; Mitchell et al.
2015), it remains unknown how (potential) investors evaluate companies’ decisions
in favor of one group or the other. In addition, it is currently unclear which specific
factors influence individual investors’ reactions to stakeholder-related decisions
(Aguinis and Glavas 2012).
Based on theoretical considerations (Crane et al. 2015; Jansson and Biel 2011;
Rivoli 1995), we postulate that two factors should play an important role in this
relationship. First, the assumed costs for fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’
interests should impact potential investors, as these costs affect shareholders’
immediate returns (Stevens et al. 2015). Second, the perceived sustainability of
fulfilling stakeholders’ interests for companies’ future success should also influence
investors’ reactions, as sustainability affects shareholders’ wealth maximization in
the long run (Jansson and Biel 2011; Wa¨rneryd 2001).
Knowing how (potential) investors react to stakeholder management is important
because, according to stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984), managers need to
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effectively balance the interests of all of their stakeholders. Because potential future
investors will use their knowledge about a company’s stakeholder management
activities to decide whether and how much to invest in the company (Clark-Murphy
and Soutar 2005; Schijven and Hitt 2012), their reactions can exert a crucial
influence on an organization’s future market capitalization. Hence, being able to
anticipate investors’ reactions when making trade-offs between shareholding and
non-shareholding stakeholders is critical for organizations.
In sum, by analyzing (potential) investors’ investment intentions in situations in
which companies need to make a trade-off between shareholding and non-
shareholding stakeholders, our paper makes several important theoretical contri-
butions. First, while stakeholder theory asks managers to effectively balance the
interests of different stakeholders, it ‘‘has been hampered by almost exclusive
analysis of stakeholders from the perspective of the organization’’ (Friedman and
Miles 2002, p. 2)—that is, from a managerial point of view. By focusing on
(potential) investors’ reactions, our paper therefore contributes to developing a more
inclusive stakeholder theory. Second, by outlining the importance of assumed costs
and perceived sustainability as critical moderating mechanisms, it reconciles
opposing theoretical perspectives (Jansson and Biel 2011; Rivoli 1995) with regard
to (potential) investors’ preference for companies that prioritize either shareholding
or non-shareholding stakeholders. Third, this paper enhances our current under-
standing of the specific factors that predict investors’ judgment of stakeholder
management activities (Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Hillenbrand et al. 2013), thereby
contributing to our knowledge about individual investment behavior (Schijven and
Hitt 2012).
From a practical point of view, the results of our study help companies to identify
factors that need to be addressed to align shareholders’ interests with those of non-
shareholding stakeholders (Freeman et al. 2010). Thereby, they allow for adapting
corporate stakeholder management and its accompanying public communication in
a way that will be seen as attractive for (potential) investors—a process that has
been characterized as central to companies’ success (Hall et al. 2015; McWilliams
and Siegel 2001; Unruh et al. 2016).
2 (Potential) investors’ reactions to the management of non-
shareholding and shareholding stakeholders
We propose that there is no direct answer to the controversial question of whether
(potential) investors punish or reward companies for deciding in favor of non-
shareholding stakeholders (Benson and Davidson 2010; Coombs and Gilley 2005).
From a wealth maximization perspective (Friedman 1970; Rivoli 1995), (potential)
investors may reduce their investments in response to management’s prioritization
of non-shareholding stakeholders due to the costs associated with it (Ogden and
Watson 1999). In contrast, and in line with a sustainability perspective (Jansson and
Biel 2011), (potential) investors may increase their investments in response to
companies’ prioritization of non-shareholding stakeholders because such prioriti-
zation is expected to sustainably increase a company’s future success.
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We propose that these seemingly inconsistent theoretical perspectives might be
reconciled by taking the underlying dimensions (i.e., assumed costs and perceived
sustainability) into account as moderators. Thus, we assume that (potential)
investors’ investment intentions in response to companies’ prioritization of either
shareholding or non-shareholding stakeholders will depend on the assumed costs
and the perceived sustainability associated with fulfilling non-shareholding
stakeholders’ interests. This reasoning is in line with current theoretical approaches
suggesting that managers judge stakeholder management against the background of
a financial time perspective, considering both short-term expenses and long-term
returns in their decision-making (Crane et al. 2015).
2.1 The moderating role of assumed costs for (potential) investors’
investment intentions
Indicating the moderating influence of assumed costs, the neoclassical paradigm
(Friedman 1970) has characterized investors as driven primarily by wealth
maximization concerns (Rivoli 1995). Thus, financial variables such as expected
earnings are important precursors of individuals’ investment behavior (Nagy and
Obenberger 1994). Moreover, it has often been argued that investors behave in a
purely rational and selfish manner while making investment decisions (Michelson
et al. 2004). With the costs of stakeholder management lowering returns for
investors (Garcia-Castro et al. 2010; Stevens et al. 2015), potential investors should
thus value decisions in favor of shareholding (vs. non-shareholding) stakeholders
when the costs of fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests are assumed to
be high. In contrast, when the costs of fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’
interests are seen as low, doing so might be seen as imperative, because good
relations with non-shareholding stakeholders ultimately pay out in benefiting
shareholders (Faleye and Trahan 2011; Hillman and Keim 2001). In consequence,
(potential) investors should prefer decisions in favor of non-shareholding stake-
holders (as compared to shareholding stakeholders) when the costs of fulfilling non-
shareholding stakeholders’ interests are seen as low.
H1 The assumed costs of managing non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests will
moderate the relationship between stakeholder management and (potential)
investors’ investment intentions, such that for high costs, investment intentions
will be higher when companies prefer shareholding stakeholders, whereas for low
costs, they will be higher when companies prefer non-shareholding stakeholders.
2.2 The moderating role of perceived sustainability for (potential)
investors’ investment intentions
In addition to the costs expected to result from fulfilling non-shareholding
stakeholders’ interests, the perceived sustainability of doing so for a company’s
future success is also likely to moderate the relationship between stakeholder
management and investment intentions (Crane et al. 2015). Because investors
pursue long-term financial goals with their investments (Jansson and Biel 2011;
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Wa¨rneryd 2001), they should be interested in the degree to which catering to non-
shareholding stakeholders’ interests can sustainably increase companies’ future
success. This interest is reflected by the growing rates of investors making socially
responsible investments (Pasewark and Riley 2010; Peifer 2014). Accordingly,
when the perceived sustainability of fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’
interests for corporate success is high, investment intentions should be higher when
companies prefer the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders over those of
shareholding ones. Conversely, when perceived sustainability is low, investors
might perceive catering to non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests as not worth the
effort or even harmful to their own interests, thus leading to higher investment
intentions when companies prefer shareholding over non-shareholding stakeholders
in these situations.
H2 The perceived sustainability of managing non-shareholding stakeholders’
interests will moderate the relationship between stakeholder management and
(potential) investors’ investment intentions, such that for high sustainability,
investment intentions will be higher when companies prefer non-shareholding
stakeholders, whereas for low sustainability, they will be higher when companies
prefer shareholding stakeholders.
3 Method
We used a within-subject experimental scenario design to test our hypotheses, as
this methodology both allows for making conclusions about causal relationships and
ensures a high degree of external validity (Aguinis and Bradley 2014). Each
participant received a total of four company scenarios, in which an international
airport operator was confronted with the claims of its non-shareholding stakehold-
ers. In each scenario, participants were confronted with one specific stakeholder
group (e.g., airline customers). To enhance generalizability, participants were
randomly assigned to one of two different claims for this stakeholder group, e.g.,
airline customers demanding either a reduction of airport fees or more personnel in
the realm of ground services.
In line with our overall research question, these claims were depicted as
representing a conflict between non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests (fulfillment
of their claim) and shareholding stakeholders’ interests (dividend payment).
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions,
i.e., the airport operator either fulfilling stakeholders’ claims (thereby favoring non-
shareholding stakeholders) or not fulfilling stakeholders’ claims (thereby favoring
shareholders). For example, participants assigned to airline customers’ claim to
reduce airport fees were either informed that the airport operator decided to fulfill
the airline customers’ claim by reducing airport fees (favoring non-shareholding
stakeholders) or to deny the airline customers’ claim by not reducing airport fees
(favoring shareholders).
After each scenario, participants rated the assumed costs and the perceived
sustainability of fulfilling the respective stakeholder claims and indicated their
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willingness to invest, as well as the amount they would invest, in the company. Data
were collected online.
3.1 Participants
Overall, 997 private investors took part in our study. To enhance the generalizability
of our findings, they were sampled to be representative of investors in Germany with
regard to age, sex, and monthly net household income (Statista 2015). Participants
were, on average, 51.31 years old (SD = 13.23), and 62.60% of them were male.
After taxes, 14.90% earned less than 2000€ per month, 51.70% earned between
2000 and 4000€, and 33.30% earned more than 4000€. The majority (57.50%) of the
participants had invested less than 30,000€, while 10.40% had invested more than
100,000€.
3.2 Scenarios
Scenarios were derived in cooperation with an international airport operator and
revolved around its core non-shareholding stakeholders (airline customers,
employees, surrounding communities, and passengers). Each scenario began with
a short description of the specific stakeholder group, after which non-shareholding
stakeholders’ claims were stated. The claims represented realistic, but hypothetical
demands for the airport operator.
Scenario 1 dealt with the airport operator’s airline customers, who demanded
either (1) a reduction of airport fees or (2) more personnel in the realm of ground
services. Scenario 2 depicted the airport operator’s employees, who demanded
either (1) more financial discounts for cafeterias, airport shopping, and booking
holidays, or (2) more training and education offers. Scenario 3 dealt with the
communities close to the airport, which demanded (1) an extended nighttime ban of
aircraft or (2) a stronger co-financing of local infrastructure development projects.
Scenario 4 revolved around the airport operator’s passengers, who demanded (1)
lower parking fees or (2) the recruitment of more security personnel to speed up
security checks.
3.3 Independent variable: manipulation of stakeholder management
As outlined above, each of the scenarios depicted a conflict between shareholding
and non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests. To manipulate stakeholder manage-
ment, this conflict was resolved by the airport operator deciding either in favor of
shareholding stakeholders (by not fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’ claims
and thereby prioritizing a dividend payment for shareholders over non-shareholding
stakeholders’ interests) or in favor of non-shareholding stakeholders (by fulfilling
non-shareholding stakeholders’ claims and thereby prioritizing non-shareholding
stakeholders’ interests over a dividend payment for shareholders). In scenario 1, a
decision in favor of non-shareholding stakeholders (i.e., the airport operator’s airline
customers) would for example be phrased as follows: ‘‘The airport operator decides
to fulfill the airline customers’ request, i.e., to clearly reduce airport fees, and
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thereby prioritizes the airline customers’ interests over a dividend payment for
shareholders’’.
3.4 Dependent variable: investment intentions
After each scenario was presented, we measured participants’ investment intentions
in the company by means of two constructs: First, we measured their willingness to
invest in the airport operator based on their answers to the question, ‘‘How likely is
it that you would buy shares of the airport operator immediately after this
decision?’’ (MacGregor et al. 2000). Participants indicated their willingness to
invest on a scale from 1 (not likely at all) to 7 (very likely). Following Weber et al.
(2002), we also assessed the amount of money that participants would invest in the
company with the question, ‘‘Please assume that you would be willing to invest up
to 1000€ in shares. How much would you invest in shares of the airport operator
immediately after this decision?’’ The scale ranged from 0€ to 1000€. The
correlation between the two dependent variables was r = 0.73, p\ 0.001, across
scenarios.
3.5 Moderating variables: assumed costs and perceived sustainability
Participants judged the assumed costs for fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’
claims by answering the question, ‘‘How cost-intensive would you guess it is for the
airport operator to fulfill this claim?’’ on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
The perceived sustainability of fulfilling non-shareholding stakeholders’ claims was
assessed with the question, ‘‘To what degree do you think that fulfilling this claim
sustainably enhances the airport operator’s corporate success?’’ on a scale from 1
(not at all) to 7 (very much).
3.6 Control variables
As we conducted aggregate analyses across all scenarios to test our hypotheses, we
controlled for the influence of the specific stakeholder groups with which
participants were presented. Moreover, previous research has demonstrated that
managers take into account stakeholders’ power to influence the company, as well
as the legitimacy (i.e., the degree to which a stakeholder has a legal or moral right
for making a claim) and urgency (i.e., the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim
demands instantaneous response) of their claims when deciding whether to favor
shareholding or non-shareholding stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997; Parent and
Deephouse 2007). As these stakeholder attributes might also play a role in
(potential) investors’ investment intentions, we controlled for these perceived
attributes in our analyses. Power (Ma = 0.93), legitimacy (Ma = 0.84) and urgency
(Ma = 0.79) were each measured with three items by Agle et al. (1999) on a scale




To check whether the participants understood the experimental manipulation, after
each scenario we asked them whether the airport operator’s decision was in favor of
the shareholding or non-shareholding stakeholders (forced choice). All participants
answered these manipulation checks correctly.
4 Results
4.1 Analytical strategy
To test our hypotheses, we conducted aggregated analyses across all scenarios,
applying regression analysis with clustered robust standard errors in STATA.
Clustered robust standard errors account for within-subject variance resulting from
each participant judging four scenarios, thereby providing unbiased estimates
(Cameron and Miller 2011). The four stakeholder groups with which participants
were presented in the different scenarios served as controls and were modeled by
three dummy variables.1 The company’s stakeholder management (1 = favoring
non-shareholding stakeholders; 0 = favoring shareholders) was also dummy-coded,
so that the positive effects of this variable imply higher investment intentions when
companies favor non-shareholding stakeholders, while negative effects imply higher
investment intentions when companies favor shareholding stakeholders. The
hypotheses were tested by calculating the interaction effects between stakeholder
management and assumed costs as well as stakeholder management and perceived
sustainability. Significant interaction effects were further analyzed by calculating
simple slopes tests for high (?1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderating
variables (Cohen et al. 2003).
4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Descriptive statistics and correlations over all scenarios can be found in Table 1.
4.3 Hypotheses testing
Regression results for participants’ willingness to invest and for the amount of
invested money can be found in Table 2.
We started by testing Hypothesis 1, which stated that the assumed costs of
managing non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests moderate the relationship
between stakeholder management and (potential) investors’ investment intentions.
Indeed, for participants’ willingness to invest, there was a significant interaction
effect between stakeholder management and assumed costs, b = -0.37, SE = 0.07,
1 The three dummy variables for the scenarios were coded as follows: DummyAirlines coded as
1 = airlines, 0 = not airlines; DummyEmployees coded as 1 = employees, 0 = not employees;












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t = -5.48, p\ 0.001; R2 = 0.18, F(13, 996) = 54.57, p\ 0.001 (see Fig. 1). The
simple slopes test revealed that, for high assumed costs, participants were more
willing to invest when the company prioritized shareholding over non-shareholding
stakeholders, b = -0.45, SE = 0.10, t = -4.49, p\ 0.001, while for low assumed
costs, they were more willing to invest when the company prioritized non-
shareholding over shareholding stakeholders, b = 0.62, SE = 0.10, t = 6.09,
p\ 0.001.
In addition, for participants’ amount of invested money, there was a correspond-
ing interaction effect between stakeholder management and assumed costs,
b = -43.72, SE = 11.24, t = -3.89, p\ 0.001; R2 = 0.13, F(13, 996) = 33.99,
p\ 0.001 (see Fig. 1). The simple slopes test revealed that, for high assumed costs,
participants were willing to invest more money when the company prioritized
shareholding over non-shareholding stakeholders, b = -46.60, SE = 16.22,
t = -2.87, p\ 0.01, while for low assumed costs, they were willing to invest
more money when the company prioritized non-shareholding over shareholding
stakeholders, b = 87.72, SE = 16.09, t = 5.45, p\ 0.001. Hypothesis 1 was thus
confirmed both for participants’ willingness to invest and for the amount of money
they were willing to invest; in the case of high costs, participants’ investment
intentions were higher when the company preferred shareholding stakeholders,
while in case of low costs, they were higher when the company preferred non-
shareholding stakeholders.
We then tested Hypothesis 2, which stated that the perceived sustainability of
managing non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests moderates the relationship
between stakeholder management and (potential) investors’ investment intentions.
For participants’ willingness to invest, there was a significant interaction effect
between stakeholder management and perceived sustainability, b = 1.18,
SE = 0.07, t = 17.23, p\ 0.001; R2 = 0.18, F(13, 996) = 54.57, p\ 0.001 (see
Fig. 2). The simple slopes test revealed that, for high perceived sustainability,
participants were more willing to invest when the company prioritized non-
shareholding over shareholding stakeholders, b = 1.04, SE = 0.10, t = 10.36,
p\ 0.001, while for low perceived sustainability, they were more willing to invest
when the company prioritized shareholding over non-shareholding stakeholders,
b = -1.30, SE = 0.09, t = -15.18, p\ 0.001.
Analyzing participants’ amount of invested money, there was also a significant
interaction effect between stakeholder management and perceived sustainability,
b = 169.08, SE = 11.64, t = 14.53, p\ 0.001; R2 = 0.13, F(13, 996) = 33.99,
p\ 0.001 (see Fig. 2). The simple slopes test revealed that, for high perceived
sustainability, participants were willing to invest more money when the company
prioritized non-shareholding over shareholding stakeholders, b = 158.83,
SE = 15.80, t = 10.05, p\ 0.001, while for low perceived sustainability, they
were willing to invest more money when the company prioritized shareholding over
non-shareholding stakeholders, b = -174.87, SE = 14.88, t = -11.75, p\ 0.001.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was confirmed both for participants’ willingness to invest and
for the amount of money they were willing to invest; in the case of high
sustainability, investment intentions were higher when the company preferred non-
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shareholding stakeholders, while in case of low sustainability, they were higher
when the company preferred shareholding stakeholders.
5 Discussion
Our study was meant to shed light on how (potential) investors react to companies’
management of shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholders. As expected, our
results show that assumed costs and perceived sustainability indeed influence
(potential) investors. Depending on these variables, investment behavior in response
to companies’ stakeholder management showed opposite patterns. For high assumed
costs and low perceived sustainability, (potential) investors’ investment intentions
were more favorable when companies prioritized shareholding over non-sharehold-
ing stakeholders. In contrast, for low assumed costs and high perceived sustain-
















































Fig. 1 Interaction effect of stakeholder management and assumed costs on participants’ willingness to
















































Fig. 2 Interaction effect of stakeholder management and perceived sustainability on participants’
willingness to invest and amount of money invested
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higher amount of money, when companies decided to favor non-shareholding over
shareholding stakeholders.
5.1 Contributions to theory
Overall, this paper contributes to our current understanding of investment decisions
in several ways. First, it broadens stakeholder theory’s focus by taking individual
investors’ reactions to corporate stakeholder management into account (Freeman
1984; Freeman et al. 2010). Our finding that (potential) investors attach importance
to the financial sustainability of stakeholder management activities is especially
valuable against the background of the ‘‘Enlightened Stakeholder Theory’’ (Jensen
2002), which argues that companies should make trade-offs between various
stakeholder groups based on the principle of long-term firm value enhancement.
According to this perspective, only those claims of non-shareholding stakeholders
that will sustainably benefit corporate success should be fulfilled. Indeed, our data
show that this approach is valuable because investors’ reactions are likely to be
positively influenced by fulfilling sustainable stakeholder claims. Going beyond
Enlightened Stakeholder Theory, however, our findings also show that costs matter,
with investors reacting more positively to the management of non-shareholding
stakeholders when the costs necessary for it are assumed to be low. Considering
investors’ perspective thus offers a valuable addition to the largely manager-focused
research conducted in this area so far (Friedman and Miles 2002).
Moreover, the results of our study indicate a means by which the opposing
theoretical perspectives regarding (potential) investors’ preference for prioritizing
either shareholding or non-shareholding stakeholders can be reconciled (Jansson
and Biel 2011; Rivoli 1995). The assumed costs and perceived sustainability
reliably moderated the effect of stakeholder management on participants’ willing-
ness to invest, leading to directly opposing investment preferences when assumed
costs were low and perceived sustainability was high versus when assumed costs
were high and perceived sustainability was low.
With this finding, our paper also contributes to the general literature on individual
investment behavior (Nagy and Obenberger 1994; Schijven and Hitt 2012) and
investors’ attitudes toward stakeholder management (Hofmann et al. 2008; Lotz and
Fix 2014): Our paper is one of the first to consider stakeholder-related investment
decisions on an individual investor level (Aguinis and Glavas 2012). By showing
that high perceived sustainability and low costs of activities meant to manage non-
shareholding stakeholders enhance investment in a company, our paper provides
evidence that investors are driven by both short- and long-term financial goals
(Jansson and Biel 2011; Wa¨rneryd 2001) and that, similar to managers, they judge
stakeholder management against the background of a financial time perspective
(Crane et al. 2015). Moreover, our paper indicates that (potential) investors are
unlikely to accept considerably lower financial gains only for the sake of addressing
non-shareholding stakeholders’ concerns (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000), but it also
suggests that decisions in favor of shareholders will only increase their investment




5.2 Contributions to practice
By analyzing (potential) investors’ reactions to the management of stakeholders’
interests, this study offers meaningful implications for practice. First, it offers
evidence-based advice for companies struggling with competing stakeholder claims.
While stakeholder theory asks managers to balance the interests of their
stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Jones and Felps 2013), it unfortunately gives little
specific guidance on how to do so (Crane et al. 2015; Jensen 2002). Our results
show that companies may use estimations about the costs and overall sustainability
of stakeholder management activities when confronted with the decision of whether
to yield to the claims of non-shareholding stakeholders or rather to give a higher
dividend to shareholders. In such cases, those claims of non-shareholding
stakeholders that come with low costs or high sustainability should be fulfilled,
as this will also be seen in a favorable light by potential future investors.
Accounting-based measures can be used to calculate potential future revenues and
current costs by engaging in stakeholder management activities (Hall et al. 2015).
Second, our findings can help companies not only to decide which stakeholder claims
to fulfill, but also to strategically adapt corporate communications about stakeholder
management activities in general (Schwarzkopf 2006). Stressing the sustainability of
managing non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests for corporate success or the low
costs associated with doing so might constitute a way in which alignment of different
stakeholder groups’ interests can be reached. For example, outlining in the annual report
why and how taking care of certain non-shareholding stakeholders will benefit the
company financially should enhance investors’ acceptance of these measures and, in
turn, positively affect their investment behavior. However, our results also highlight that
companies might be well-advised to carefully handle communications in case they
decide to prioritize the interests of their shareholders. Thus, it might also pay to use press
releases to outline the fact that the costs of fulfilling non-shareholders’ claims were too
high, while the contribution to the organization’s long-term success was too low to
ensure acceptance. Hence, interestingly, organizations should not assume that decisions
in favor of shareholding stakeholders will always be the investors’ preferred option. In
sum, adapting corporate communication might thus constitute an important measure to
ensure (potential) investors’ willingness to invest—a crucial prerequisite of stakeholder
management’s success (Hillenbrand et al. 2013).
5.3 Limitations and opportunities for future research
Despite this study’s theoretical and practical contributions, it also has some limitations
that provide fruitful opportunities for future research. First, we used scenario studies to
test our hypotheses because they allow for analyzing the factors that drive individuals’
investment decisions in a controlled setting (Ackert and Church 2006). This approach
is common in studies examining factors that affect individual investors’ decision-
making (Barreda-Tarrazona et al. 2011; Clark-Murphy and Soutar 2004; Hofmann
et al. 2008; Pasewark and Riley 2010; Schwarzkopf 2006). Moreover, it is important
for enhancing clarity about the specific factors influencing individuals’ investment
decisions, as these have so far largely remained a ‘‘black box’’ (Schijven and Hitt 2012,
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p. 1250) due to the database methodologies predominantly employed in previous
research. However, this approach also bears the disadvantage of being based on
realistic but hypothetical investment decisions and of measuring investment intentions
instead of actual investments. Future research might therefore benefit from repeating
our results, for example, in an experimental simulation in which participants actually
invest their own money or incur gains and losses through their investment decisions,
or, alternatively, in a retrospective analysis of real company cases. Nevertheless, we
are confident that our results apply to real-world settings, as scenario studies are
generally characterized by a high degree of external validity (Aguinis and Bradley
2014), and intentions have been theorized and empirically proven to be the best
predictors of subsequent behavior (Ajzen 1991; Sheeran 2002).
To reflect the competing stakeholder claims with which companies are frequently
confronted in practice (Clarkson 1995; Mitchell et al. 2015), our scenarios implied a
contrasting trade-off between shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders,
meaning that only one or the other of shareholders’ or non-shareholding
stakeholders’ immediate interests were fulfilled. While this approach is valuable
for mapping regularly occurring conflicts between shareholders and non-sharehold-
ing stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995), it does not describe the full range of
possible shareholder–stakeholder constellations, as shareholding and non-share-
holding stakeholders’ interests are not always directly at odds (Friedman and Miles
2002). It speaks to our results that, even though our scenarios were framed in a way
that implied lower dividends for shareholders when non-shareholding stakeholders’
claims were fulfilled, the investors examined did actually favor the prioritization of
non-shareholding stakeholders in the event that the assumed costs of doing so were
low and the perceived sustainability was high. Thus, while we believe that our
design constitutes a conservative test of our hypotheses, replicating our results with
a design in which different stakeholders’ interests are not depicted as mutually
exclusive would be a worthwhile endeavor for future research.
In our study, we focused on two potential moderating variables—assumed costs
and perceived sustainability—which exerted a decisive effect on investors’
reactions to stakeholder management activities. Yet, their effect may further be
influenced by other variables. Investors might react differently to stakeholder
management activities if they doubt that a certain stakeholder-related decision
resulted from managers’ volitional choice. Assuming for example external
circumstances such as the absence of sufficient resources to explain managers’
decision making might weaken potential negative reactions to refusing sustainable
stakeholder requests. It would hence provide a valuable approach for further
research to take this potential additional moderator into account.
Finally, we tested our hypotheses in a sample representative of German investors,
which might restrain our findings’ transferability to international contexts. Previous
research has characterized continental investors (e.g., Germans) as being more
strongly driven by long-term returns than Anglo-American ones (e.g., US citizens;
Aguilera et al. 2007). Hence, it is possible that the perceived sustainability of
managing non-shareholding stakeholders’ claims plays less of a role for American
investors. Including investors’ cultural background as a potential moderator in the
relationship between stakeholder management’s perceived costs and sustainability
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on the one hand and investment decisions on the other could therefore provide an
interesting avenue for future research.
6 Conclusion
As companies are still struggling to find the optimal way to manage shareholding
and non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests (Bird et al. 2007), our research shows
that investors’ preferences for prioritizing either the interests of shareholders or
those of non-shareholding stakeholders crucially differ depending on the assumed
costs and perceived sustainability associated with the decision. These findings
broaden stakeholder theory’s focus by taking individual investors’ reactions to
corporate stakeholder management into account. Providing evidence for and
extending the ‘‘Enlightened Stakeholder Theory’’ (Jensen 2002), our results show
that managers are well advised to highlight the fact that perceived sustainability is
high and assumed costs are low when favoring non-shareholding stakeholders in
their decisions, whereas they should highlight the low sustainability and high costs
related to stakeholder management when favoring shareholders.
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